89 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |